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EQUALITY BETWEEN NATIONS AND INTERNA-
TIONAL CONVENTIONS, AS DETERMINING
FACTORS IN SHAPING MODERN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW*
Law (that is, human law looking to political ends), is in none
of its branches an exact science. It changes with the times. But
particularly is this true of international law. It has, in great meas-
ure, to deal with those periods in human society when in certain
places, municipal law is silenced by arms; when the force of gov-
ernment is exerted, not against individuals, but against the force of
government, and private rights of property and security must give
way to the overmastering demands of public necessity.
The progress of international law in modern times has been
largely in the direction of preventing war. It has also been largely
in the direction of ameliorating the conditions which war brings.
One is as important as the other; for the absolute prevention of
war, in however remote a future, is to the scientific student of his-
tory and psychology impossible, unless all nations climb to an equal
plane of civilization and morals, and that a far higher plane than any
nation has yet attained.
Everything tends to prevent war, which brings many nations into
friendly intercourse with reference to their mutual concerns, on an
equal footing. Especially is this true of international conferences
to give new force and precision to international law. We cannot,
however, expect nations to agree on sanctioning rules to which they
know that they will 'be unable to conform.
It must be frankly acknowledged to .be precisely here that is
found the most serious obstacle to the reform and codification of
international law. The different powers still represent very differ-
ent states of social advancemnt. Conduct to be confidently antici-
pated from an enlightened nation cannot be reasonably looked for
on the part of one not yet accustomed to follow the principles which
sound politics prescribe for the just regulation of public duties.
Nevertheless the theory of equality between independent nations
is the very soul of public international law.'
*In preparing this article free use has been made of the Inaugural
Address, delivered by the author, as Honorary President of the Conference
of the International Law Association held at Portland, in August, 1907.
x. See an able exposition of this theory in its application to a CentralAmerican power by Jackson H. Ralston, as umpire in the Sambiaggio Case,Venezuela Arbitrations of 19o3, 679.
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It differs in this respect essentially and radically from the
national laws of most of the leading powers. These recognize dis-
tinctions of birth or title, that is, the inequality of men in the rela-
tions of society. International law for those whom it governs has
always asserted that they are equal in rights, however unequal they
may be in power. Each is the legal peer of every other. This is
the necessary result from the possession of independent sovereignty.
It is by universal insistence on this rule of equality that those
who would advance the place of international law, whether public or
private, as a social force can best secure their end. Only by such
insistence can the moral support of the world be fully gained.
Universal public opinion can be rallied to the defence of any theory
of modes of regulating.relations between nations which is based on
indubitable principles of social justice, and of no theory based on
anything lower or less.
Those principles will in every case ultimately determine the
judgment to be pronounced on any international dealings by that
court without appeal, unseen but not unfelt by men, that is always
in session,---truly named by Daniel Webster "the great tribunal of
modem civilization."
The rule of equality has been less often violated in practice in
the domain of private than in that of public international law.
Questions of private international law are peculiarly for the courts
of justice to determine, and no nation presumes to dictate to the
courts of another.
To the settlement of many of the most perplexing of those ques-
tions the world hardly yet realizes what progress has been made
through the several conventions emanating from the four Hague
Conferences for the advancement of Private International Law of
1893, 1894, 19oo and 19o4.
Two of the great powers-Great Britain and the United States
-took no part in those Conferences. Their absence was attributa-
ble first to their territorial separation from the continent of Europe;
second, to their adherence to the principles of feudalism respecting
lands; and third, to their acceptance of the rule that domicil should
determine status.
That rule, though long and firmly imbedded in English and
American jurisprudence, cannot be said in either country to be the
declaration or result of national policy.
We, in the United States, took it originally from English law
as part of our colonial inheritance, and it has spread naturally from
our older to our newer States. English law took it from the older
continental jurists and from European practice.
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European practice has changed. The drift of the last century,
particularly in its closing quarter, was away from the test of dom-
icil to that of nationality. This drift first assumed the force of a
strong current in Italy,-a sign of her new life as a united king-
dom. It has been greatly accelerated and broadened by the conven-
tions proceeding from these Hague Conferences on Private Inter-
national Law.
England and the United States cannot shut their eyes to the fact,
for instance, that ten European nations have thus agreed, with
regard to an institution on which all human society depends, that,
as between their subjects, nationality shall be the criterion of civil
rights in respect to assuming or dissolving the marriage relation.
It is not to be forgotten that whichever standard be adopted-
nationality or domicil-for the determination of any question of
status, the result will ordinarily be the same. Few ever have a
domicil in a country to which they do not bear allegiance.
On grounds both of convenience and of right much certainly
can be said in favor of the test of allegiance.
It is to his nation that every one looks for the protection of his
rights of person or property. He looks to it only, when at home.
He looks to it ultimately, when abroad.
These rights, while he remains one of its inhabitants are deter-
mined by its will. Why should they not be, when he calls
upon it, from a foreign land, for protection? Has it a duty to pro-
tect abroad what it would not give at home?
It was formerly argued, with more force than it can be now,
that a man's domicil could be ascertained more easily than his
nationality. The steady extension of the system of public records
to the incidents of the life of the private individual, and the tend-
ency of the world to subject both emigration and immigration to
governmental inspection and regulation have made it easier than
it once was to determine questions of nationality with promptitude
and accuracy.
The most valuable asset of a new country, under the conditions
of modem society, it has been said,2 is apt to be its annual accession
of adventurous foreigners. Thorold Rogers, twenty years ago, esti-
mated the value to the United States of those who entered it as a
hundred million pounds a year. These men are gained without the
cost of rearing and educating them.
No wonder that modern immigration laws require strict records
of who thus arrive, and when and whence they come, and where they
plan to go.
No wonder, on the other hand, that if a naturalized citizen leave
2. Rhodes' History of The United States, I, 355.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
his adopted country to refound a home in his native land, it should
proceed to cast him off and make his long-continued absence pre-
sumptive proof of his renunciation of its protection.
3
In regard to the English and American doctrine as to the lex
silus, as determining matters of succession to real estate, it must be
conceded -also that it is not in entire accord with the spirit of mod-
ern society. The right of aliens to inherit is every year more gen-
erally conceded by law or treaty. The general growth of the re-
cording system, as to land transfers, the facility with which real
estate can thus be made a basis of credit, and the comprehensive
mortgages, privileges, or hypothecations to which it has been every-
where subjected, for the security of contractual obligations, have all
contributed to mobilize the soil. The gradual detachment of politi-
cal rights from land-owners, as such, has had a similar effect, and
it is to have a still greater one.
The days of feudalism, as an existing institution are long past.
The day is passing when its theory can be preserved, in a world
increasingly devoted to freedom of commerce and freedom of gov-
ernment.
It seems, therefore, to be not impossible that on both these points
of difference England and the United States may yet fall in with the
modern trend of European opinion.
Every international congress or conference in which they or their
citizens participate has a certain influence in that direction. Such
gatherings naturally make, in some degree, for the unification of
world-opinion as to the proper rules of social order to be, in each
particular nation, formulated in law. Through them the last hun-
dred years have created a new force in this direction, which has been
continually gaining strength. Through them came the Declaration
of Paris, the three Hague Conventions formulated in 1899, and the
setting up of the Hague Tribunal as a working institution. Through
the last of them, which has just closed a four months' session,
attended by every considerable civilized nation, is likely to come an
international prize court that will speak for the world.
Since the Congress of Vienna, more than seven hundred such
assemblages, of real importance, counting those both of a public
and of a private character, have taken place in Europe and Amer-
ica.4 Every one of these, in bringing th representatives or citi-
zens of different and distant powers into friendly intercourse on
topics of common interest, has done something towards drawing
the world together, and making it acquainted with itself. Every
3. See, e. g.: the Act of the Congress of the United States as to Immi-
gration and Naturalization, of June 29, 19o6.
4. See the American Journal of International Law, I, pp. 565, 579, 8o8.
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one of these is a witness to the equality of nations and to the power,,
of fraternal association to equalize their opportunities for advance-
ment, assimilate their institutions, define their relations" betweea
themselves in the interest of justice, and gradually unite the forces
of civilization. Every one of them of a public .character, which
leads to an international convention, emphasizes the equality of the
contracting parties, both in respect to the manner of making the
convention and the possibility of its future alteration.
International law is that body of rules which civilized States
generally have agreed to apply in determining their mutual rela-
tions. Every international convention setting up such a rule,
whether between two only or between many powers, is a step in the
direction of extending the rules which international law embodies.
If it be a convention of a world-wide character, like the Universal
Postal Union, or the Geneva Red Cross Convention, its effect will
be great and immediate. If it be but a temporary arrangement be-
tween two minor powers, its effect will be slight, and may be eva-
nescent. But in either case progress has been made. A new force
has been taken on, though it be one acting only within a narrow
sphere. An example has been set which, if it stand the test of time,
may be followed elsewhere.
International conventions not infrequently are the indirect out-
come of international assemblies of mere private individuals. The
Geneva Red Cross Convention originated in such a way. Popular
sentiment is awakened by public discussion, and sometimes all the
more when that discussion can have been dictated by no selfish
motives of national policy. In diplomatic conferences national sel-
fishness is not always out of place. In conferences of private indi-
viduals it is; and this often gives the results of their investigations
a double strength in the public mind.
The progress of all law is mainly dependent on the initiative of
private individuals. The scholar in his study conceives an idea and
gives it to the world. If it have merit, it will some day catch the
eye of some one in public life, and it may become his grateful work
to incorporate it in the institutions of his country. The jurist sets
in scientific form what before lay unarranged and apparently unre-
lated. The codifier, though not perhaps till centuries later, adopts
his work. So especially in international law may advancement be
hoped for from the results of private reflection and research. They
become tangible when nations make them the subject of conven-
tions, and because all nations are political equals, the influence of
such conventions will depend less on the importance of the parties
to them than on the merit of the provisions which they contain.
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